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an earlier draft of this paper.Intra-Sub-Saharan  African Trade
Is it too Little?
I) Introduction
Official statistics suggest that trade among Sub-Saharan African" (SSA) countries as a whole,
as well as among various regional groupings in SSA, is a small fraction of each country's total, and
that share has remained roughly constant over the years (Table  1)1.  Many observers of African
affairs believe this level of intra-SSA trade is "too small" and should be expanded further and a
number of regional schemes have been initiated with that goal.
African countries' regional trade shares could be "too small"  either normatively,  in comparison
to an optimal level, or empirically. Empirically,  trade shares could be either absolutely  small or small
relative to  expectations.  While intra-SSA trade  is absolutely small, we ask, is it smaller than
expected? For whatever reason intra-SSA trade is judged to be too little, there have not been many
attempts in the literature to quantify how little is little. In order to decide whether trade among the
members of a regional grouping is "too little", some model for the determination of the volume of
bilateral trade must be specified. We are not aware of any such model for the sub-region. As a result,
there is a gap in the existing  literature between the intuition that intra-SSA trade is too little and the
empirical evidence to support the intuition.  This paper is a partial attempt to fill this gap. It is a
partial attempt for we look at the question strictly from a positive point of view. We ask a simple
question: Compared to a sample of other countries with roughly similar economic characteristics,  do
'Sub-Saharan Africa comprises  all of the African continent except for Northern African countries
(Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) and South Africa, which is excluded because its
bilateral trade is affected by obvious political factors.
2  We will return in section IV to a discussion  of the unreliability  of official trade statistics.2
SSA countries trade too little with each other? A traditional gravity model is employed to provide
the answer. Contrary to popular belief, the gravity  model produces no evidence that inter-SSA trade
is below expectation. This conclusion does not of course contradict the claim that intra-SSA trade
may be too  little from a normative point of view, namely that it falls short of some welfare and
growth enhancing level, although the burden of proof that higher trade among SSA countries would
indeed lead to higher welfare and growth wotuld  fall upon the shoulders of the supporters of such a
claim.
This paper has five sections.  The first briefly reviews the arguments about the merits of
regioiial trade integration in SSA and the previous empirical literature arguing that intra-SSA trade
is low.  The second introduces the gravity model of bilateral trade flows  and reviews its merits.  The
third section estimates the parameters of a simple gravity model and uses these estimates to ask
whether intra-SSA trade is systematically  lower than the level predicted by the model.  The fourth
section discusses  some additional implications  of the model's estimates and addresses  some limitations
of the model -- in particular, the effect of existing regional arrangements on trade and the effect of
unrecorded intra-SSA trade on our analysis. The final section discusses the interpretationi of the
positive  results  and  the  relationship  between  our  positive  finding  and  normative  policy
recommendations.3
II)  Regiotial Trade Integration:  Background and Previous Literature
Regional integration (RI), mostly  understood as the integration of goods and factors markets
through discriminatory  trade arrangements, has been a persistently pursued goal by SSA countries in
the past three decades. The creation of an African Common Market by .ne year 2000 represents the
ultimate  objective of numerous existing integration schemes'  in  the African continent.  RI, by
enabling individual  countries to overcome the barriers of small size and poor human and physical
capital endowment, has been considered by many African politicians and scholars as a prerequisite
for breaking away from the colonial pattern of trade, often characterized by heavy reliance on an
undiversified and vulnerable structure of exports, and for fostering economic growth.
The normative vies  of the desirability of increased trade among SSA countries is closely
related to the literature  in favor of increased South-South trade'  in general and to arguments in
favor of regional economic integration SSA in  particular" 1. Increased trade  within the various
regional groupings and within the SSA as a whole has been considered an essential indicator of the
success of the various integration schemes on both political and economic grounds. Politically,  many
African states have equated "increased intra-African trade with self-reliant policies required to break
from  the  economically 'dependent'  trading  patterns  established during  the  colonial period"6'.
'For a summary  of the principal characteristics  of the most important regional groupings in SSA
see T-.ble 1.
' For a critical -'view of this literature and evaluation of developing countries' experience with
South-South trade arrangements see Greenaway  and Milner (1990) and Langhammer and Hiemenez
(1990).
5 For a critical review of arguments in support of regional integration in SSA and evaluation of
SSA countries' experience with regional integration see Foroutan (1992).
6Berg (1988), p. 13.4
Economically,  increased intra-African trade is also a natural indicator of the extent of integration and
of the  achievement of the preconditions for realizing the  theoretical advantages associated with
greater integration. For example, if a theoretical advantage of integration consists in intra**regional
product specialization to exploit scale economies" 1, and/or to reduce the cost of achieving a specific
level of  industrial output  for each  member country", then greater  product specialization would
certainly be associated with greater intra-regional trade. Thus, the failed increase in intra-SSA trade
is evidence of the failure of integration efforts in SSA 9 .
As is widely known, intra-SSA trade flows are small in absolute magnitude.  Total exports
from SSA in 1988 were $3.66  bn.; by comparison, Brazilian  exports were $8.7 bn. to the US and $9.3
bn. to the EC. Intra-SSA trade is also a small fraction of their total trade -- only 5.3% in 1988,  down
from 5.7% in 1970'.  However, to our knowledge only two recent  studies attempt to quantify if
actual trade is less than either potential or expected trade.
'See Corden (1972).
'See Johnson (1965) and Cooper and MasseU  (1965).
9  Many proponents of RI in SSA remain silent on the fact that increased trade among countries
adhering to  a regional integration scheme does not  necessarily indicate that the scheme itself is
welfare enhancing for the welfare effect of such a scheme depends not only on how much trade has
been created among partner countries but also on how much trade iias been diverted from the rest
of the world. A prominent example is that of the Eastern  European countries which were quite
successful  in increasing trpde among themselves, but their distorted pattern of trade was almost surely
welfare reducing. See fo  example Havryly.;hyn  and Pritchett (1991).
10 UNCrAD Handb-ook  of Internation?l Trade and Development Statistics, 1990. Exports from
Developing Africa to Dleveloping  Africa.5
The first, Alansoor et al. (1989), argues for the existence of sizable unexploited potential trade
within SSA. They define potential trade as  '*  e value of imports currently coming from the rest of
the world for which at least one SSA country is making significant exports (at least one percent of
its  exports)  to  the  rest  of  the  world" (p.45).  This  potential  trade  was computed  using UN
COMTRADE 1983  trade flows  at the four digit SITC level of disaggregation. Potential intra-regional
trade for SSA as a whole was S4.5  billion, 16 percent of the region's total exports for that year.
However, this calculation alone cannot suggest that intra.  SSA trade is too small. One needs
a model for the expected value of this "potential' trade.  While one can perhaps define "potential"
trade, as total within region intra-product-category  trade, associating  that with "unexploited  potential"
trade implicitly  assumes that the expected, or even attainable, value of intra-product-category trade
is zero.  A vast literature on intra-industry trade shows there are sound reasons for the simultaneous
import and export of similar goods even in the most successfully  integrated regions.  For example,
intra-product-category trade for the USA and the EC10..' in 1983 was equal to 22 and 14.5 percent
of their non-oil imports respecti- ely, roughly the same as that for SSA.  Given the complete (or
nearly so) absence of barriers to  trade in goods within the US and  the EC, one would be hard
pressed to identify this trade as "unexploited"  regis..ial trade potential or to argue that these levels
are higher than should be expected.  Therefore, the calculation of "potent.a;' regional trade cannot
begin to address the question of expected regional trade unless in addition to calculating potential
trade, some reasonable notion of expected potential trade is also created.
"This is the current European Community minus Portugal and Spain.6
In the second study, Kourouma (1989) focuse- on West Africa and employs a probabilistic
model, first developed by Savage and Deutsch  (1960), to compute  the value of expected trade
between any pair of countries. In Kourouma's model the expected value of trade  flowing from
country i to country j is derived from  the share of i in to..  1 v orld exports and the share of j in total
world imports. Roughly speeking, if the share of i in total world exports is p and the share of j in total
world imports (which is equal to total world exports) is q, the expected trade between i and j is
approximately equal  to  p times q times the  total value of world trade.  Using this definition of
expected trade, Kourouma constructs an index of the deviation of the actual trade (T 1j) from the
expected trade (Eu) between i and j as:
R,,= (T,-F-,j)/E,,
The ratio R, can vary from minus one to plus infinity. A negative value of R 1, means that actual trade
between countries i and j fell short of the expected. A positive value indicates that trade between i
and j exceeds the expectations.
The calculation was made for thirteen Westem African countries for two time periods,; Q72-
77 and 1978-83. In seven of thirteen cases Rlj  was  negative for both time periods, suggesting  that for
those  countries intra-SSA trade  was less than  expected, while for  the  rest  the  evidence was
ambiguous.
Kourouma's study makes an advance on simply comparing shares of trade by adjusting for
relative sizes. For example, French imports from Belgium are only 9% of French imports, and so are
an absolutely small share.  However, Belgium's exports are only 3.4% of world exports.  Thus the7
ratic of Belgium's share of French imports to Belgium's  share of world imports is 2.6, suggesting  that
French imports from Belgium are relatively large.  However, this example makes it clear that this
simple adjustmcnt is far from adequate as a model for predicting trade flows, as factors that would
explain why French imports from Belgium arc, relatively high (e.g., proximity, a shared border, no
trade  barriers, a  shared  language) are  excluded.  We  turn  next to  the  gravity model, which
incorporates these factors into a model f^r bilateral tradc flows.8
111 The Gravity Model
The gravity model posits that the volume of trade bet  een any two countries i.j (TV),  is a
function of each countly's trade potential (TPI, 1TP)  and their mutual trade attracticn (TAk):'z
1)  TU = f (  TPI,  TP 1 TA  )
Int  orier  to implement the gravity  moael, we specify  the factors that affect the trade potential of each
country and the factors that affect the trade attraction between countries.
A country's absolute trade potential depeiids on its total economic size (GDP) and the trade
intensity (the ratio of t.dde  to GDP).  A country's trade intensity is affected both by its geographic
and economic characteristics" 3 '.  The geographic determinants of trade intensity that we use fall
into two classes:  size and island.  The greater  a country's total area, the smaller the fraction of
economic activity that is expected to cross borders.  Whether or not a country is an island can also
affect total trade, but the effect is ambiguous,  as one would expect lack of land borders to reduce
trade, but to the extent islands are poorly endowed with resources, this will require additional trade.
Economic factors can also affect trade intensity, but are much more difficult to capture.  We use the
level of GDP per capita as a proxy for the level of econu.nic development.
12  The gravity model is so named because of the analogy with gravitational force between two
objects, that depends on the masses of the objects and t..  distance.
1"  Many applications of  the gravity model substitute actual trade  flows for trade  potential
specifying  the model as:
TV=  f  (  Tj,  TJ,  TAg )
where T is trade.  Our model can be thought of as predicting trade as a function of trade potential
and trade attractiveness simultaaeously.9
The trade attraction between two partners is determined by the total cost of bilateral trade.
Total cost includes transport costs, po;;cy and political barriers to trade, as well as general "business
environment' variables, such as sharing a common language. A key element of the traditional gravity
model is the dual recogniition  that transport costs are a major determinant of trade attractiveness end
that the distance between two counitries is a good proxy for transport costs"4. Sliaring a common
border w3uld tend to increase trade flows,  even for a given distance.  The attractive_. s  of trade
between  any two countries can  also be  enhanced  by policy choices, such as the  existence of
preferential trade arrangements (e.g., the EEC) or discrimninatory  barriers (is.g., the USA and the
USSR).  Finally, the trade  attractiveness of any two countries can be  influenced by cultural or
historical factors.  Cultural similarity can increase trade if the type of goods produced is similar.
Sharing a common language can increase trade by facilitating  communication. Additionally,  historical
ties (such as colonial relationships) can enhanc'. the ties of transport and communication. Finally,
two hypothesis exist on  the effect of the difference between two countries' levels of per capita
income.  The Linuer h;pothesis is ths  countries with similar living standards will share a broader
range of goods to trade and hence trade, especially inter-industry  trade, wil! be higher. On the other
hand, GDP per capita differences are highly correlated with differences in factor endowments and
hence smaller differences could reduce trade, especially  comparative advantage driven intra-indust,y
trade.
Summarizing  our gravity model is of the form:
2  T  =f (GDP,,  GDPPCi,  Area 1,  IDE,  GDPJ,  GDPPC,,  Areaj,  ID>,
Distance,,  BD,,  I GDPPCi-GDPPCj l
PAD#k,  LDVI )
14  Various improvements on  the gravity model are premised on  finding better  proxies for
transport cost than distance.  Balassa and Noland, 1988, Geraci and Prewo, 1977.10
where GDPPC is GDP per capita, ID is a durriniy  if i is an island, BD is a dummy  variable if i and
j  share  a border,  PAD  is a set  of dummy variables for a  set  of  k different  preferential  trade
arrangements (=1 if both i and i are members of the particular arrangement), LD is a set of dummy
variables if countries share a similar language (=1  £f i,j share ianguage)"'.  A brief data appendix
describes the data and the sources used.
The gravity model has been widely and  successfully used in  the empirical literature  on
international trade"'.  Aitken (1973) used the model to estimate the effect of the EEC on trade
flows, finding that  the  trade effects of the  EC grew over time as policy integration proceeded.
Havrylyshyn  and Pritchett (1991) used this model to show that trade between Eastem Europe and
Western Europe is much less than forecast by the model, which has been consistent with the massive
realignment of trade underway subsequent to the demise of the CMEA.  Thoumi (1989) used a
similar approach to  study the  trade effects of regional trade  preference arrangements in Latin
America. Srivasta and Green (1986) uf  . a gravity model to show the importance of the existence of
political variables.
Although equation 2 is unwieldy,  the basic logic is straightforward. The model allows  other
factors to play a role in determining bilateral flows so that, even though Belgium's ($192 bn) and
Mexico's ($236 bn) GDPs are roughly the same, the trade between Belgium and France will be
predicted (correctly) to be much larger than trade between Mexico and France.
IS  We allow the affect of sharing a language to vary across languages and allow the effect of
various trade agreements to vary across agreements, as not all are expected to have the same impact.
16  Deardoff (1984), in his review  of empirical work on international trade, says "In spite of their
dubious theoretical heritage, granting models have been extremely successful empirically".11
Equation 2 will bL. estimated and used to determine whether intra-SSA trade is less than
expected, given the determinants.  We use two approaches. The first approach estimates the gravity
model without the SSA countries in the sample and uses the estimated coefficients from this model
to predict intra-SSA trade.  These predictions are then compared with actual flows. The second
includes the SSA countries in the estimation sample and  introduces dummy variables to  test for
differences in intra-SSA trade.12
IV) Estimation and Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the results of estimation of equation 2 in natural logarithms"'.  Since we
are interested in countries whose trade patterns are determined similarly to those of the African
countries (that is, whose gravity model parameters are a priori similar), the non-African reporter
countries are limited to  those countries with GDP per capita less than USS 3,000.  In addition,
countries whose total trade in 1980  was less than USS 300 million  are excluded. This criterion limited
the number of reporter countries to thirty-four non-African and nineteen SSA countries.  For each
reporter country (i) the trade with each of ninety-five  partners (j) is included for a total of 3,230 non-
African, or 5,035 total observations.  We use only non-fuel trade (total  trade less SITC 3), as the
determinants of bilateral flows  of fuel trade (primarily  petroleum and coal) are likely different than
other trade flows. The model is estimated for imports and exports separately, for two reasons. First,
bilateral import patterns may  be determined differently  than export patterns. Second, and importantly
in the SSA case, using both imports and exports attenuates the problem of unrecorded trade (see
below) as one reporter's recorded imports are a partners's exports and vice versa.
Before reporting the results, we must discuss one econometric complication in estimating
equation 2.  Since the value of trade flows cannot be negative, the value of the dependent variable
is censored at zero, and OLS in this case produces inconsistent estimates. This problem has generally
been ignored in the empirical literature.  However, under certain conditions, the OLS bias is linear
in the inverse of the proportion of the sample not at zero (Greene, 1981). For low income countries
the fraction of bilateral trade observations at zero is .3 or higher, implying that OLS estimates will
17  The model was estimated in logs to make the estimates less sensitive to extreme observations
to provide elasticities that are easy to interpret and compare with those in the literature.13
be  biased towards zero by roughly 40%.  This is consistent  with our  findings, as the  maximum
likelihood (tobit) estimate of the coefficient on distance was generally higher that the OLS estimate
by a third or more.
The basic idea behind censored dependent variable models is that instead of the conditional
expectation of y given x being linear, the model is:
E(yIX)  = P5X  if  A'X+e>O
E(yIX)  2  o  if  9'X+e<0
The predicted value of y conditional on x is zero if the predicted actual value is less than zero, and
is the linear function of X otherwise. We used the tobit estimates that correct for this censoring bias
by estimating using the maximum  likelihood function:
lnL  =  -n.  (ln(2ir)  +  ln(a2))  1-a2  E(Tv-6 1 6XV)2  +
2  2  I
where  the  summation subscript  1 indicates a  sum  c ;er  the  observations with  positive trade
(T1 > 0)  and subscript 0 indicates observations at the  truncation point  (T7'  = o)  and
X1  y  is the matrix of trade determinants. This estimation form gives the intuition that the positive14
observations are used to  estimate the relation of value of trade  to determinants, given trade is
positive, while the observations at zero are used to estimate the probability trade is positive.
As usual, the gravity model's empirical performance is good.  An appropriately calculated"'
R-squared for the non-African sample is .646 for imports and .578 for exports. These are quite high
values for cross-sectional regression and suggest that the gravity model does a reasonable job of
predicting the pattern of trade flows. Nearly all of the variables have the expected sign and most are
statistically  significant"W.  As expected, trade volume increases significantly  with a common border
and falls off quite sharply with distance. Trade increases with total output, roughly one for one.  The
larger the reporter's country's area and the higher the GDP per capita of the reporter the lower the
trade potential, although for partner countries there is no significant effest of GDP per capita.  A
shared language increases trade significantly. Similarly,  aU of the included preference arrangements
show a large positive effect.
We will use this model to examine African trade in two ways.  Say we partition the data
between African and non-African countries:
ITAfr  x  [  XA  o  o  1  [  pAfr  1  [  eAfr
T  on-Afr  o  xNon-Afr  J  pNon-AfrJ  I  LNon-Afrj
"In a non-linear model such as the Tobit, the strict linear decomposition of total errors is not
possible.  The  R-squared  reported  is  1-SSE/SST,  where  SSE  is
C  (y  - 9) 2 where  9  =  '  (x*a/o)  ,  0  (.) is the  cumulative standard normal distribution
function.
'9  The standard errors reported  are the heteroskedascity consistent standard errors of White
(1981).1S
Our first method predic4  c the African  trade flows  using  the coefficients  from the low income,  non-
African  country  sample  and the African  determinants,  i.e.  f  if  -,  XAfr  *  nOn-Afr.
The second method tests whethcr intra-African  trade is different  by introducing  shift  variables  that
would  allow  African  trade to be lower  or more responsive  to distance  within  Africa,  holding  other
coefficients  constant.16
W.A)  Simulated Intra-SSA Trade
The first method of testing the hypothesis that intra-SSA trade is too low is to compare actual
intra-SSA trade to the trade predicted for the sub-region by combining estimates of the gravity  model
coefficients that exclude data on SSA trade  with SSA data  for the  independent variables.  The
estimates from columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 are used to simulate the predicted pattem of bilateral
trade for each of the nineteen SSA countries in the sample. The values of the independent variables
(GDP, distance, etc.) are used to predict the bilateral flow with each of the 95 partners2', which
are then used to calculate the shares of trade.  The predicted bilateral trade shares for SSA assume
that trade flows in the sub-region were determined exactly  like for the other low income countries
determined by our estimated gravity model.  Table 3 compares the actual import and export shares
of SSA countries in the sample with their predicted trade.  If intra-SSA trade were low for reasons
particular to the sub-region, then the model would predict greater intra-regional trade than actually
observed.  This is not the case.
Actual imports from other SSA countries are higher than predicted imports for nine of the
nineteen countries (about half).  For all nineteen countries, the mean (median) share of actual
imports  is 3.5% (1.8%)  versus  the predicted  mean (median)  values  of 3.6% (2.4%)21'.  On average
2  The usual x* Beta prediction predicts only the value of trade, given that it is larger than zero.
In the tobit case the predictions  are  a(x4)  *  (x*5)  , where  0  (.) is the cumulative
standard normal distribution, the probability that trade is greater than zero, times its predicted value,
conditional on being non-zero.
21  We report the mean and median since some of the countries have very high actual shares and
low predicted values.17
3.5% of these countries' imports come from other African countries, wher -as the gravity model
predicts an only slightly  higher value, 3.6%.
The share of exports going to other SSA countries is higher than predicted in eleven of the
nineteen cases. The mean (median) actual trade share of 4.6% (2.7%) is somewhat higher than the
predicted mean (median) of 3.9% (2.1%).  According to these estimates, African countries export
more than expected to other African countries.
These results suggest that the low share of intra-SSA trade is more than fully accounted for
by the fact that those SSA countries which are close to other SSA (and hence are their natural trade
partners) are also countries that are very poor and quite small and  hence have very little trade
potential.  All SSA non-oil exports were only about 1% of total world non-oil exports in 1988 and
so the crudest share calculations would suggest that if SSA countries traded in proportion to total
trade, the share of a given SSA country going to SSA would only be 1%. The gravity  model increases
that prediction to account for proximity,  common borders, etc, and raises that prediction to 3.5%, on
average.  After accounting for trade potential and trade attraction, discrepancies between Africa's
predicted intra regional trade and actual trade are very small.18
IV.B)  Direct Estimates of SSA Trade
The second method for testing whether intra-SSA trade is lower than expected is to include
variables that directly capture SSA specific  effects in the determination of bilateral trade.  We include
four dummy  variables for the region. These variables indicate statistically  if SSA trade patterns differ
from the other countries in the sample. The four dummy variables are:
African'J, =  1 if both the reporter and the partner are in SSA.
African4,  i  distance4",  an interaction of distance and the dummy  variable African'i.
African', =  1 if the reporter country is in SSA;
African oil', = 1 if the reporter is an SSA oil exporter;
The dummy when both  partner  and reporter  are in SSA is the critical variable.  If it is
negative this indicates that, holding other factors constant, African countries trade less with each
other than similar countries do with their neighbors. The coefficient on the second dummy  variable
will be negative if distance is a greater barrier to trade amongst SSA countries than other countries
with similar characteristics,  as has been suggested due to poor infrastructure. The coefficients  on the
final two variables indicate if the trade of SSA countries (or SSA oil countries) with aU partners is
higher or lower than trade of non-African countries with similar characteristics. If the coefficient is
negative, then SSA trade is too low in the sense that African countries trade less in total than other
countries, again ceteris paribus.
Columns 1 (for imports) and 3 (for exports) of Table 2 report the results when the SSA
countries and the African dummy variables are included.  The coefficient on the dummy variable
African' in the  import regression is negative, implying that  total  non-oil imports of  the African19
countries are lower than those of other economically  similar countries.  This is consistent with the
general perception that total SSA imports are affected by restrictive trade policies.
The variable of primary interest, the dummy  variable  for intra-SSA trade (Africanu),  is positive
but statistically  insignificant.  Thus, if anything, intra-SSA imports are actually higher than expected
using the conventional gravity  model. There is no evidence of any differential bias against intra-SSA
trade.  The export results teU a similar, stronger story.  The dummy variable for intra-SSA exports
is strongly (.84) and significantly (t-stat 2.22) positive.  From the gravity model, there is simply  no
evidence that SSA countries trade less with each other than would be expected given their low trade
potential.  The estimates indicate the opposite. In spite of the fact that the share of intra-SSA  trade
is low in  absolute  terms,  it  is  actually higher than  expected on  the  basis of  the  underlying
determinants.='
As mentioned earlier, it has often been argued that poor communications and transportation
infrastructure linking SSA countries has been an important impediment to  trade within the sub-
region. The lack of adequate infrastructure suggests  that distance would be a greater barrier to trade
between SSA countries than between other countries. In order to test this conjecture, the interactive
dummy  variable  Africanu*distanceO  is included in the estimated equation. This variable takes the value
of the log of distance if both reporter and partner are in SSA.  If distance were a greater inhibiting
factor to trade for SSA than for other countries, the coefficient on this variable should be negative,
indicating a sterper  fall of trade with respect to distance for trade within SSA. The results in Table
2 indicated that while the point estimate in both the import and the export regressions are negative,
2If  the regression equations that includes SSA countries are run in levels as opposed to natural
logarithms, the coefficient on the dummy variable African'j is positive but insignificant in both the
import and the export equations. These results broadly agree with those in the text.20
they are both practically  and statistically  insignificant. The coefficient estimate for imports (exports)
of  -.06 (-.13) is about  one-fourth  (one-half) its standard error  .225 (.242).  A  standard error
confidence interval around the point estimates (from -.28 to .16, -.37 to .11) includes numbers equal
in magnitude but of opposite sign. The gravity  model gives little evidence that in fact distance is a
greater  barrier  to  intra-SSA trade  than it  is for other  countries.  This result goes against the
apparently common feeling that  the poor  quantity and quality of communications and transport
infrastructure between SSA countries is a major obstacle to intra-SSA trade. However, if the optimal
investment in  infrastructural links is related to trade  potential, this result may suggest that  the
infrastructure may be no worse than expected, given the low trade potential.
Other  interesting points emerge from the  regression results. First, as suggested by other
studies, some regional arrangements appear to have increased trade amongst their members. The
dummy  variables for regional trade arrangements outside SSA, namely the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAI-TA), and the Central American
Common Market (CACM) are all positive and significant.  If we include among the preferential
agreement variables  three  regional  arrangements for  SSA countries  (CEAO,  ECOWAS, and
UDEAC), only CEAO appears to have positively  and significantly  affected intra-sub-regional  trade.
The coefficient on the dummy  variable for ECOWAS is positive in the import equation and negative
in the export equation but insignificant in both cases. The coefficient on the dummy variable for
UDEAC is negative throughout and insignificant.  This result is fully compatible with the pattern of
intra-group trade reported in Table 1. The data indicate that between 1970,  when CEAO was not yet
created, and 1975, two years after CEAO was formed, intra-CEAO trade share doubles but remains
stagnant thereafter. Intra-ECOWAS and intra-UDEAC trade patterns, on the other hand, appear to
be unrelated to the formation of the two groupings in 1975 and 1976, respectively.  Whatever the21
impact of the regional groupings on the trade pattern of their member states, it must be once more
stressed that the fact that intra-regional trade is high does not necessarily  imply that the preferential
trade arrangements were beneficial as the trade may be diverted, rather than created trade.
Second, no variables were included for colonial status, but a dummy variable was included
that indicated if the reporter was an ACP (African-Caribbean-Pacific)  country and the partner an EC
country, to account for Lomd preferences.  This effect was strong and significant for both exports
from, and more intriguingly,  imports into the ACP countries, where EC's imports generally receive
no formal preference.  The estimated effect on imports is smaller than exports.  This suggests that
the Lomd preferences  have been successful in increasing ACP  exports to  the  EC.  The Lomd
preference  on imports may reveal any number of things: either  tied  aid, the effect  of colonial
relationships, or perhaps that prices are higher into Africa (Yeats, 1990b)  given that the dependent
variable is the dollar value of trade.  The strong effect of the language variables also suggests that
historicallculturallcolonial  ties have a significant  impact on the pattern of trade.22
IV.C) Limitations of the Empirical Results
As with all empirical work, there are limitations to t.,e present study.  We will discuss two
classes of limitations: data related and conceptual.
First, official trade statistics for Africa are extremely defective.  They ignore a great deal of
trans-border trade which routinely takes place amorJ, neighboring countriesZ'.  It is estimated that
for some countries the unrecorded trans-border trade  (UT!)  may be as high if not higher than
recorded trade'.  Because of the magnitude of the UTT in Africa, it is believed that the use of
official statistics may seriously under-estimate the true amount of intra-SSA trade.  Moreover, for
reasons that range from the degree of competence of customs officials to under- or over-invoicing
and the use of artificial prices in evaluating the flow of t;ade, whatever trade is detected, is recorded
with a great deal of error.  For all these reasons, there  often exists a large discrepancy between
reporter and partner recorded trade flows  in SSA.  For example,  Yeats (1990a) shows that the average
discrepancy between matched export and import values for thirty-five  SSA countries in 1982-83  was
more than sixty percent.  However, the existence of UTT likely strengthens our conclusions.
The existence of UTI  flows  should lead to a serious under-estimation of the true magnitude
of intra-SSA trade relative to non-SSA trade.  This creates a bias to find trade too low, not too high
or about right. First, in recorded border trade, although U=T is large, it is known that most of this
trade takes place in goods of foreign origin and/or goods of domestic origin but ultimately  destined
I' On the importance, institutions and consequences of unrecorded trans-border trade in SSA see
Azam (1990), Barad (1990), and Deardorff and Stolper (1990).
2' See Barad, op. cit.23
to foreign markets and as such does not qualify as true intra-SSA trade. For example, Barad (1990,
p. 104) states that " Much of the trade in manufactures appears to involve products originating from
outside the African regiorn Locally  produced agricultural  products, minerals, and wild animal products
(skins, ivory) enter  UTI  because of export restrictions or unfavorable government-fixed producer
prices. Exchange rate policies, domestic industry protection, government subsidies, and tariffs are
among the other determinants influencing  the direction of UTT flows.  Such flows  are likely  wherever
divergent govemment policies in nearby states result in significant  differential between local market
prices. The size of UTT flows  will  vary according to the profits realized by moving these goods across
the border". However, to the extent that official  siatistics do underestimate the true amount of intra-
SSA trade, our conclusions  are unaffected or rath.-r strengthened, for if the present results show that
official trade is no lower than expected, then the ar,.ual trade among SSA countries must a fortiori
be above the expected when the expectations are formed on the basis of data on countries with less
porous frontiers.
Finally,  the discrepancy  between reporter and partner data also leaves our results unaffected
since we implicitly use both  reporter  and partner data  by using imports and exports separately.
T-herefore,  the results are not affected by asymmetric  reporting errors.  The discrepancies between
reported imports and cxports for African countries do not drive our results as they are consistent for
both flows.
The second data limitation of our results is that the sample includes only nineteen SSA
countries.  This is not a serious limitation for two reasons.  First, all of the economically  larger SSA
countries that account for the bulk of intra-regional trade are represented.  The column in table 3
shows the share of trade with all SSA and with our sample. Rarely is more than 1% of trade missed24
by excluding the smaller African countries. Second, unless the bias against trade with the sub-region
is larger for economically  smaller couniries, there is no reason to believe that the resuits would be
different for the other countries.
The major conceptual limitation of the present paper is related to the model used to predict
trade  flows.  The gravity model is not  a  well specified economic model because  the equation
explaining  the trade volume is not derived from tne optimizing  behavior of economic agents, although
some theoretical rationalizations do exist (Anderson, 1979  and Bergstand, 1989).  However, there are
two defenses. First, the model in fact performs well, producing empirically  plausible results here and
in other literature.
More importantly,  a basic message of this paper is that some model needs to be used to form
judgements about whether a given level of intra-regional trade is high or low. In much of the existing
literature on intra-regional trade, the model implicitly  used is naive, as shares of regional trdde are
compared directly  across regions. There is always  some interest in the statement that intra-SSA trade
is 5.3% of SSA trade while intra-EC trade is 60% of all EC trade.  However, the more interesting
question is whether intra-SSA trade is lower than expected.  Only if trade is lower than expected do
obstacles need to be invoked to explain why it is low. The latter question requires a model on the
basis of which the expectations are formed.  While the gravity model has its limitations as a model
of bilateral trade volume, it is certainly preferable to forming conditional expectations naively  on the
basis of crude shares. Perhaps a different model of bilateral trade volume with greater sophistication
and empirical credibility  would  show that intra-SSA trade is low relative to expectations formed under
that  model.  Until then, the  conclusions with our gravity model, however suspect, are  the best
quantitative judgement available.25
VI) Conclusion
It  has been  argued that  trade  among SSA countries is also too small and obstacles are
frequently mentioned to explain why: insufficient  or non-existing  transportation and communications
networks within the sub-region5', itself a direct consequence of centuries of colonial domination;
the existence of a multiplicity  of non-convertible currencies for countries (outside the CFA franc
zone)2'; extreme ethnic, cultural and linguistic  diversity; and very high political instability"'.
This paper asks a simple question and gets a simple answer.  We ask, is the observed small
proportion of intra-SSA trade less than one would expect? Using the gravity  model of bilateral trade
volumes as the basis for predicting trade flows  we can answer, no.  The low degree of intra-SSA trade
is completely explained by the low degree of trade potential amongst  the countries, primarily  because
of their low level of GDP.  There is no evidence that intra-SSA trade flows are differentially low
either because of policy or infrastructural weakness.
Of course, by asking a simple question, we forego answering more complicated ones.  For
example, what  would be  the  potential  trade  among SSA countries  had  there  been  complete
liberalization of trade flows  among them and how does this potential compare to the actual?  Or, by
how much would the potential trade itself increase if some of the more structural barriers to intra-
SSA trade were removed?  Or more complicated still, are efforts at increasing intra-regional trade
5 See for example Diouf (1990).
26See  for example Frimpong-Ansah (1990).
27  All of these factors could naturally be also thouiaht of nc  having contributed to a grcatcr awl
lesser extent to tne failure of integration efforts in SSA.26
in SSA a good thing?  This paper can't and doesn't say.  However it does contribute to the debate
by showing  that the low degree of intra-SSA trade is not the result of factors that work differentially
against such trade.  Increasing intra-SSA trade  is not just  a  matter of  removing discriminatory
distortions or  biases in infrastructure.  It  require positive action, such as providing differential
incentives to intra-regional trade.  However, providing differential incentives that raise trade above
the "natural" level must clearly first be justified on the ground that it is welfare improving.
In our view, the fundamental explanation for the failure of various RI schemes in SSA to
increase  the  flow of  trade  among the  SSA countries  is  to  be  linked  to  the  inability and/or
unwillingness  of  these countries to carry out  the  preferential trade  liberalization measures that
represent the prerequisite for trade creation among integrating markets. Failed preferential trade
liberalization among the majority of SSA regional groupings is itself a function of several factors.
These include fiscal revenue constraint, the uneven distribution of costs and benefits of integration
among participating countries  to  various schemes, the  associated difficulty in  devising proper
compensation schemes from the gainers to the losers, and the inward-looking, import-substituting
economic philosophies that have guided the policy action of the majority of African governments'.
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Tablc I
GENERAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF REGIONAL  GROUPINGS  IN SSA!
1989  UNLESS  OTHERWISE INDICATED
Total 
Trade with SSA Nan c of Regional  Date  Number of  Total  Population  GNP  Per capita GNP  Degrce  of openneu  Share  of Inur-group  Export Trmde  in Toul  As %  of total 3rouping  Created  Members  (millions)  (bil.S)  (US S)  ((X+M)IGNP)  Exports  expolta
1970  1975  1930  1985  1990  t9S0  1990
WEST AFRICA
ECOWAS  1975  16  195  64  326  50  2.9  4.0  3.5  5.3  5.7  3.6  6.4 CEAJ1  1973  7  50  24  476  46  6.3  12.7  1.9  3.7  10.5  13.2  15.0 mt,  1980  3  12  4  355  46  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.1  0-9  2.9
CENTI  AL AFRICA
UDEAC  1976  6  24  19  806  42  4.3  2.7  1.6  iAe  3.0  2.1  5.9 CEPtiL  1932  3  47  12  260  21  0.4  0.3  01  0.1  0.2  4.1  7.6
EAST  ANT)
SOUTHII  ?RN  AFRICA
PTA  1981  IS  212  5S  274  40  3.0  9.3  7.6  5.5  5.9  8.4  7.6 SADt'C-C  1980  10  S0  25  311  55  2.6  3.7  2.1  3.9  4.1  3.5  6.3 SACIP-  1910  5  39  K9  2294  54  nVA  na.  na.  na.  na.  n.a.  na.
TOTAL  SSA  47  480  162  340  43  2.S  6t)
1I  SSie auniformly  deruied to exclude South Afuica.
2/  Dat  for SADCC  and  SACU exclude Namibia.
ECOWA4S =  Econoinic Conmnunity  of Weasem  African Statee,  includes: CEAO and MRUn  membecr  plus Cape  Verde, Ganmbia.  Ghana. Guinea  Biaaau,  Nigeria and Togo. CEAO - Communaute  Economique  de L'Afrique  de L'Oueat, includes. Benin, Burkina Faso,  C6oe  d'lvoire,  Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. MRU  =  Mano River Union, includee:  Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone
UDEAC'  Union Duanifre el Econornique  de L'Afrique  Centrale, includes: Cameroon,  Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea  and Gabon. CEPGL =  Communaute  Econonmique  des Pays  des Grands Lacs, includes: Burundi, Rwanda  And  Zaire.
ffA  Preferential  Trade Area for Eatem  and Southern African States,  includer: Angola, Burundi, Comors,  Djibouti,  Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritiuu, Mozanbique,  Rwanda,  Somalia,  Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda,  Zambia, Zimbabwe.
SADCC  - Southeem  African  Developnent Coordination Conference,  includes: Angola, Botawana,  Leootho, Malawi, Mozatmbiqte, Namibia, Swaziland, Taneania,  Zambia, Zinmbabwe. SACU  ;  Southem African Cuatoma  Union,  includes:  Botswana.  Lerotho, Naiibia,  South Africa, and Swaziland
Souree: Fomutan (1992), Tables 2 and 3.28
Table 2
Maximum Likelihood Eatimatae  of the Tobit Gravity Model  for
Countrias with GDP per capita <  3,000 as Reporters
ImDorn  Exports
w/ African  w/o African  w/  African  w/o African
Afri;Cn dummies
African' (-  1)  -.34 (.08)"*  .08 (.103)
African oil exp  (-1)  -.06 (.132)  -1.07 (.165)"
African'  (- 1)  .60 (.319)  .78 (.318)'
African'  * di;t'  -0.07 (.196)  -.11 (.196)
PrOximity
Distance'  -1.66 (.07)**  .1.75  (.077)"  -1.69  (.074)-*  -1.65 (.080)"
Bordetr (-  1)  .68 (.23)"0  .54 (.308)  .89 (.23)00  .89 (.309)"
Reporter
GDP  .82 (.031)"  .88 (.036)"*  1.31 (.040)*"  1.53 (.050)"-
GDPPC'  .14 (.048)"*  -.098 (.057)  -.38  (.051)"0  -.63 (.058)00
As"'  -.18  (.028)0-  -.18 (.033)**  -.44 (.037)**  -.53 (.047)"0
Island' (=  1)  -.01 (.083)  .06 (.045)  .20 (.095)0  .22 (.112)'
Pa&rter
GDP  1.34 (.025)"0  1.28 (.023)*  .97 (.029)"0  .94 (.036)0
GDPPC'  -.08 (.038)'  -.009 (.045)  .08 (.042)  .07 (.048)
Area  -.28  (.018)"*  -.214 (.023)"  -.19  (.021)"0  -.19 (.02.5)"
Island'  (=1)  .33 (.081)**  .505 (.098)00  -.08 (.089)  -.06 (.108)
(GDPPC`  - GDPPC' I  -.11 (.05)-  -.029 (.066)  -.11 (.058)*  .03 (.069)
Preferential
ASEAN  .81 (.278)**  .621 (.291)0  1.45 (.36)"  1.32 (.37)"0
LAFTA  .94 (.25)"  .92 (.263)"*  ;.59  (.23)**  1.68 (.24)"-
CACM  3.26  (.33)**  3.31 (.37)*  3.37  (.29)"  3.46  (.26)"0
LOm6  .94 (.173)0*  .26 (.208)  1.66 (.157)*  1.20 (.53)'
LAnguage
English  .49 (.138)"0  .73 (.202)  .32 (.144)  .15 (.213)
French  1.26 (.183)*  .53 (.55)  1.42 (.202)"0  1.47 (.66)'
Spanish  .62 (.155)*  .67 (.162)**  .43 (.173)**  .72 (.18)**
constant  1.59 (.201)"0  1.19 (.24)"*  1.96  1.67 (.27)"0
i  Countries (obvs)  54 (5,130)  34 (3,230)  53 (5,035)  33 (3,135)
I.e.  I .88  1.91  2.00  2.00
Pseudo R
2 .630  .646  .555  .578
Note:  Standard errors  in paretthesis,  si()  - C;gnificant  at the  I%  (5%) level.29
Table 3
Comparison  of Actual and Gravity Model Predicted  Value of lnUs-SSA
Trade Shares for Nineteen SSA Countries;  Average Values  for 1980-82
Non-oil imDorts  Non-oil ExportS
Shares  Shares
Total  All  Sample'  SamploI  Total  All  Sample  Sample#
Imports  ROWY  SSAY  Actual  Predicted  Exports  ROW"  SSAY  Actual!v  Predicted
Country  mnS S  %  %  %  %  mile S  %  %  %  %
COTE  6,003  95.3  4.7  3.9  2.3  7,826  92.55  7.45  5.3  2. I
D'IVOIRE
CAMEROO  3,990  97.3  2.7  1.3  11.7  2,494  94.14  5.86  4.5  10.1
N
CONGO  1,782  96.3  3.7  4.0  5.4  536  98.07  1.93  2.7  11.6
ETHIOPIA  1,725  98.6  1.4  1.4  0.4  1,200  92.85  7.15  1.0  0.4
GABON  2,302  98.5  1.5  1.5  4.1  829  96.69  3.31  3.5  12.6
GHANA  2,552  92.8  7.2  6.5  7.1  2,317  99.82  0.18  0.2  4.9
KENYA  4,183  96.2  3.8  1.6  1.8  2,767  84.40  15.60  7.7  2.1
LIBERIA  1,073  97.3  2.7  1.8  2.7  1,606  98.30  1.70  1.1  1.6
MADAGAS  1,356  98.3  1.7  0.7  0.9  977  98.92  1.08  0.3  08
CAR
NIGERIA  43,799  99.3  0.7  1.0  1.0  1,874  94.74  5.26  7.4  2.8
NIGER  1,398  85.3  14.7  17.1  12.5  1,446  88.51  11.49  11.7  8.0
SUDAN  3,966  98.2  1.8  1.8  0.4  1,606  99.59  0.41  0.4  0.2
SENEGAL  2,411  94.0  6.0  4.3  1.7  1,429  80.48  19.52  15.9  1.4
SOMALIA  1,297  92.3  7.7  6.3  0.3  428  98.8S  1.12  0.8  0.0
TOGO  1,240  94.6  5.4  5.7  5.7  805  87.24  12.76  15.8  4.0
TANZANIA  2,299  98.47  1.6  1.5  2.2  1,560  92.76  7.24  3.4  2.5
ZAIRE  2,655  97.7  2.3  3.1  3.5  5,366  99.02  0.98  1.9  5.2
ZAMBIA  2,324  97.1  2.9  2.6  2.4  3,188  99.03  0.98  0.7  1.9
ZIMBABWE  1,158  94.6  5.4  0.3  2.5  1,811  94.55  5.45  2.5  1.8
Average  95.9  4.1  3.5  3.6  94.2  5.8  4.6  3.9
Median  1.8  2.4  2.7  2.1
ROW  - Rest  of the World.
100 - ROW Share
Trade with the SSA countries in the sample  as a percentage of trade with all partner countrieS in the Sample.
Predicted share of trade  with the SSA countries in the sample; all trade data from COMTRADE.30
Data appendix
Imoorts. Exiorts
Mij, Xij  - Data on the average  annual US  dollar value  of non-fuel  (Total  leas SITC  3) imports  and exporu
between each reporter and partner for 198-82  were extracted from the UNSO COMTRADE database.
CztIraphv
Distanceij  - The  straightline  distance  between  economic  center  of  gravity  of  the  respective  countries,  from
Linneman (1966).
Borderij  - =  1 if countries ij  share a border,  0 otherwise.
Economic activity
GDPi  - Total  GDP in USS of the reporter  (importer  or  exporter)  from the World Bank Atlas.  The atlas
method uses a conversion  factor other than the ofricial when the official rate is wildly distorted.
GDPPCi  - GDP per capita of the reporter  from World Bank Atlas.
Sizei  - The land area of the reporter in '000 square kilometers.
Islandi  - =  I if reporter is an island.
ODPj  - Total GDP in USS of the partner  country from World Bank Atlas.
GDPPCj  - GDP per capita of the partner from World Bank Atlas.
Sizei  - The land area of the partner  in '000 square kilometers.
Islandi  - =  1 if partner  is an island.
Linder  - The absolute value of the difference in per capita GDP between the source and partner,  from Surmmers
and Heston (1988).
Trade preference arranzements
D ij  - This  is a dummy  variable  =1  if  both countries  are  mcmbers of  any type  of  preferential  trading
agreement.  The  arrangements  included  are:  ASEAN,  CACM,  CEAO,  ECOWAS,  EEC,  EFTA,
LAFTA,  UDEAC,  and Lome preferences.
Cultural
L ij  - The only cultural factor considered is whether or  not the countries share the same language, a very
crude, but easily calculated proxy.  Dummy variables were included for English, French, and Spanish.31
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